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We develop a theory of mechanism design when agents are able
to interfere with each others’ communication channels. We develop
a kind of revelation principle, the “Noninterference Principle” which
permits representation of arbitrary mechanisms by direct ones. The
incentives to interfere will depend on the mechanism chosen;inter-
ference thus constrains contractual design. For instance, authority
emerges as a governance mechanism which may economize on the costs
of securing channels, particularly when the organization needs to be
ﬂexible and there is diversity in its members’ preferences. We also
show that there are environments in which the possibility of interfer-
ence actually facilitates full implementation by providing a means of
“protest” in undesired equilibria.
1 Introduction
In a recently publicized case [10], an employee of Morgan Stanley who had
been dismissed allegedly for expense account abuses claimed that on the con-
trary the cause of his dismissal was racism and homophobia.The ﬁrm tried
to produce testimony from a witness who was claiming that the employee
was in touch with a computer hacker to plant racist and homophobic e-mail
in the computers of the company.As a result, the employee was arrested on
∗Very preliminary and incomplete. Prepared for the ESSET, Gersenzee, Switzerland,
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1charges of forgery, coercion and “computer trespass”.The lawyers for the
employee admitted that he payed the hacker $200 to plant the phony e-mail.
However, it later appeared that the witness had received a $10,000 payment
from the ﬁrm and the charges against the employee were dropped.What is
distinctive about this case is not that agents can process limited sets of sig-
nals or that signals arrive at their targets with noise.Rather, the distortions
in the signals arise because competing agents interfere with each other’s at-
tempts to transmit information.It is the eﬀect of this aspect of imper fect
communication on contracting that we wish to explore in this paper.
There seems to be little practical reason to believe that the messages
transmitted during play of an arbitrary mechanism are immune to interfer-
ence, or that they can be made secure at zero cost.Typically mechanisms
rely on high powered incentives to play a certain way; a player who deviates
stands to punished heavily and the others rewarded.But this creates an
incentive to make other players “look bad.” If a player can eﬀectively make
it appear that another player deviated, he will.The assumption that this
cannot happen, implicit in mechanism design, is extreme.A more natural
starting assumption would be that messages reach their target only imper-
fectly, depending on actions that other players take and perhaps on costly
investments in relevant technologies.Mechanisms must be designed bearing
in mind the endogeneity of interference.
One way in which this endogenous form of interference diﬀers from other
forms of limited communication is that it does not seem subject to a tech-
nological ﬁx.There have been vast improvements in the transmission and
processing of information over the last century.But this may do little to
diminish the beneﬁts from forging a signature, for instance.On the contrary,
a computer which may be used to encode account information may also be
used by a suﬃciently motivated hacker to change it.Endogenous interference
is thus likely a permanent feature of human existence.
Our approach to studying interference is straightforward.We begin with
the conventional mechanism design framework in which preferences are as-
sumed to depend on a set of states of the world.The actual s tate is common
knowledge among the players.Messages must be transm itted from the play-
ers to a mediator who, implements a decision based on the messages he
receives.
We depart from the standard set-up by taking the transmission of these
messages to be problematic: they may be interfered with by the players of
the mechanism.1 Each player is assumed to have a “channel” along which he
1Interference may also arise from physical sources. We leave discussion of this “exoge-
nous” interference to another paper.
2transmits his message; one player interferes with a second player by (prob-
abilistically) substituting the second player’s own message with a diﬀerent
which he transmits along the second player’s channel (thus assuming his
identity).2
Now in practice the process by which players conduct interference might
be quite complicated, involving for example delicate extensive-form modeling
issues (you break into my oﬃce and steal my letterhead; later, I break into
yours and ﬁnd a letter you have written in an imitation of my handwriting
on my letterhead; I replace this with a letter of my own and while I’m there
substitute a fake version of the letter you wrote on your own behalf but forgot
to mail, etc.). More generally, there are a many ways in which people might
interfere, ranging from rhetorical ploys to electronic jamming to outright
forgery.No doubt the ease of accomplishing interference will depend in part
on individual skills, on the physical nature of the messages themselves, on
encryption technology, on the availability of physical or institutional means
of sending secure messages, etc.A complete understanding of these issues
certainly falls out of the domain of competence of the economist (at least
these economists!)
We therefore take an agnostic approach, and simply posit that there is a
technology of interference with certain simple properties.Speciﬁcally, each
player transmits a message along every channel; the message that the medi-
ator receives on channel i may have been sent by player i or by some other
player j. The probability that i’s message in the guise of j arrives on j’s chan-
nel can be inﬂuenced by costly “eﬀorts” that the players exert in securing
their own channels and accessing others.We make one important indepen-
dence restriction: the probabilities and eﬀort costs are independent of the
messages sent and of the “physical” nature of the messages.
This “black box” approach to modeling the interference technology, though
crude, seems the natural starting point for investigating what allocations are
feasible in the presence of interference.A distinct advantage is that it yields
a generalization of the revelation principle, which we dub the “Noninterfer-
ence Principle” that allows representation of the potentially enormous set of
feasible mechanisms by the much smaller set of direct mechanisms.These
direct mechanisms involve having each player send a “signed” message on
behalf of himself and on behalf of each of the other players.The princi-
pal implements diﬀerent allocations depending not only on the full set of
messages but also on the signatures.Any equilibrium of a mechanism with
2This model corresponds precisely to the internet practice of “spooﬁng.” Of course,
“channel” should be interpreted broadly; it can indicate for instance one player’s vocal
chords and the mediator’s ear. Interference may involve shouting or more clever and
deceptive rhetoric
3possible interference can be represented by a game in which the messages
consist of the true state of the world and the true identities of the players
who sent them.3 Thus, with all feasible allocations generated by a relatively
simple set of mechanisms, the study of mechanism design with interference
is amenable to optimization and/or equilibrium techniques.
We then go on to apply this apparatus in to a simple contracting envi-
ronment in which agents must take a common production decision; the total
surplus maximizing decision depends on the state of the world.Diﬀerent
agents have diﬀerent state dependent costs and beneﬁts associated with the
decision.We show that if their preferences are consonant, then even with
the possibility of interference the ﬁrst best can be achieved with no costs of
securing channels.However, when preferences diﬀer enough, and when the
organization needs to be “ﬂexible” (speciﬁcally, there is a large variance in
states and the optimal decision therefore also varies widely across states), this
will no longer be feasible.The second best mechanism may involve giving
“authority” or eﬀective decision making power to one person.In the direct
game this is accomplished by securing his channel perfectly; in equilibrium
all other player’s messages are ignored.When all channels cost the same to
secure, this person is the one whose preferences are most consonant with the
organization objective.
Authority begins to assume the richer meaning it has in everyday par-
lance.Not only does it convey the notion of having the power to decide on
things which aﬀect others.But also the idee that one’s word carries a lot
of weight relative to others’.Our model shows that these two ideas may be
closely connected: having the right to decide is equivalent to being the only
one with a perfectly secure channel.This idea broaches the question raised
in the recent debate on incomplete contracts by Maskin-Tirole: why can’t
message games substitute for authority? Our answer is that authority can
be modelled as a kind of message game (with interference) and can arise
endogenously as an optimal mechanism in certain environments.
1.1 Literature
Our work is related to a number of papers in organization theory.One
strand of the literature considers exogenous constraints on communication:
agents have limited ability to transmit or process information.Part of this
literature (e.g., Bolton-Dewatripont [3], Radner [17], Radner-van Zandt [18],
3Although all players are sending messages along all channels in the direct game, they
are being honest and “up front” about it (they are signing with their true identities) and
in this sense they are not interfering with each other.
4Segal [19]) ignores incentive problems and conceives of organizations essen-
tially as communication networks designed to overcome these limitations.
The design of the organization itself does not aﬀect the ability of an indi-
vidual agent to communicate.Other papers (such as Green-Laﬀont [5] and
Melumad-Mookherjee-Reichelstein [14]) do incorporate incentives and exam-
ine how standard incentive schemes or how the design of communication
structures may be altered when communication is costly.By contrast, the
framework presented in this paper is not actually based on the inability for
agents to process information: messages in our set-up may be arbitrarily
complex and/or processed arbitrarily quickly.But n either is it inconsistent
with this approach.Indeed, a deeper examination of the technology under-
lying the interference probabilities might very well take these considerations
into account.
The other strand of literature is that in which communication is endoge-
nously limited by the design of the organization itself.Here the l iterature is
perhaps more sparse.Fudenberg-Tirole’s theory of signal jamming is close
in spirit to our notion of interference.Aside from the con text in which the
idea is applied, there is a methodological diﬀerence between our approach
and theirs in that the signal jamming structure itself is not endogenously de-
termined by the agents in the model.Perhaps more closely rel ated in spirit
are “inﬂuence activities” (Milgrom-Roberts [15]).However, their focus is on
the weakening of incentive schemes in response to inﬂuence costs; they too
take as given the communication and decision making structures.
Finally, the notion of authority has appeared in a number of recent papers,
beginning with Grossman-Hart [6] (see for instance Hart [7], Hart-Moore [8],
Aghion-Tirole [2]).These papers start from the assumption that al locations
cannot be completely speciﬁed by contracts; decisions are then necessarily
made by one of the parties without having been speciﬁed in advance, which is
interpreted as power or authority.We certainly think this is a useful notion
of authority.There have been a number of recent criticisms of this approach
(Maskin-Tirole [13]) based on the fact that incompleteness can be ﬁlled by ap-
propriate message games.Both sides of the debate miss the connection to the
security of communication channels, and therefore the idea of an authority
as one who is inﬂuential as well as powerful.Moreover, the scope for author-
ity arises endogenously here: agents are perfectly capable of conceiving of
writing arbitrarily complex contracts.But interference problems limit what
could actually be carried out via contract.
52A M o d e l o f I n t e r f e r e n c e
We consider an environment with 2 agents.The extension to n agents is
straightforward, but introduces some minor complications that we wish to
avoid at present.The state space is Θ and the set of decisions is D. At time
t =1 , a realization of the state θ ∈ Θ is observed by all the n agents but
not by outside parties.Agents have state contingent prefe rences on decisions
and we assume that these preferences are represented by vNM utility func-
tions ui.u i (d,θ) denotes the utility of agent i if decision d ∈ D is chosen
in state θ; when d is a lottery, ui (d,θ) denotes the expected utility of the
lottery d. At time t =0 , a “contract” is signed: a contract is here a mech-
anism, i.e., ({Mi},g) where Mi is the set of messages available to agent i
and g : ×2
i=1Mi → D is a message contingent decision rule.Assume that the
agents have at the time of contracting common beliefs F about the distri-
bution of the states of the world.We assume that F has a continuous and





design assumes that each agent has access to a perfectly “secure” channel
of communication: when message mi
i is received on channel i, it is known
that agent i sent this message.We depart from this assumption and assume
that after contracting but before the realization of the state4, agents can exert
eﬀorts e that enable them to secure their channels and to interfere on other
agents’ channels.To keep things tractable, we use an indirect represen tation
and assume that eﬀorts translate into a probability distribution over mes-
sages received on each channel.Given a vector of eﬀorts e =(e1,e2), there
is a probability µi(e) that a message that he sends on his channel arrives
safely and a probability 1 − µi (e) that the interference of the other agent
succeeds.5 The (private) cost of eﬀort is ci(ei). Note that this formulation
4The extension of the analysis to the case where the eﬀort levels are exerted after the
realization of the state is straightforward but somewhat more complex.
5In general, and agent can spend eﬀort not only to secure his channel but also to






and the probability that
player i succeeds on channel j is µi
j (e), where e =
￿
e1,e2￿
. In the application we assume
that µi
i(e) depends only on eii.
The general formalism can allow diﬀerent interesting situations. For instance, suppose
that µi
i(e) is diﬀerentiable. In general, we should expect that more eﬀort on one’s channel
increases security, ∂µi
i/∂ei
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player 2 ﬁnds it easier (needs a lower e2
1) to interfere on
the other’s channel. A simple example of this could be learning-by-doing: learning how to
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Figure 1:
allows for public investments in security before contracting (e.g., creation of
secured court proceedings, or of a postal service which ensures against mail
fraud); public investments could make channels secure even in the absence
of private investment, that is µ(0)=µ0 > 0. Hence, while there might be a
social cost associated with the public investment, they might also make con-
tracts more eﬃcient once µ0 is sunk.Note that even if µ0 = 1, interference
by the agents might generate µ < 1 in some contracting environments.
Interference by agent i on channel j takes the form of agent i sending
a message mi
j on channel j. Let mi =( mi
1,m i
2) be the vector of messages
that agent i sends on the two channels.Communication is then summarized
by a vector µ =(µ1,µ 2). For instance, µ =(1,0) represents a situation in
which channel 1 is secure but channel 2 is not, µ =(1,1) is a case where each
channel is secure and µ =(0,0) is a case where each channel is not secure.
Note that the two last cases are equivalent from a mechanism design point
of view: in µ =(0,0), each agent has in fact access to a secure channel: the
channel of the other agent! For a given µ, if agents play m1,m2, the outcome




































with probability (1 − µ1)µ2.
Hence, agents play an “extended two-stage game”: at the ﬁrst stage
they choose to secure their communication channels and then they play the
message game that they contracted upon.
To summarize, the sequence of events is as follows.
In this extended game the strategy of each agent consists of an eﬀort
level ei ∈ R2 and of a message sending strategy σi :Θ× R2 → (M1 × M2),
i.e., σi (θ,ei) is the interference strategy of agent i in state θ when his eﬀort
choice was ei.
7It will be convenient to denote the probability that agent i succeeds on
channel 1 and agent j succeeds on channel 2 by πij (e). From (1), we have








,i=1 ,2,j=1 ,2.Let π(e)=(π11 (e),π 12 (e),π 21 (e),π22 (e))
and h =(h11,h 12,h 21,h 22).Then, if agents use strategies m the outcome is
the lottery π(e)·h(m) that selects outcome hij (m) with probability πij (e).
An equilibrium is deﬁned in the usual way: for given e, the strategies σi





















































, for all θ, for all i.
We can deﬁne our concept of implementation.
Deﬁnition 1 A decision rule f :Θ→ D is implementable at cost c if there
exists a mechanism (M,g) and an equilibrium (e,σ) of the extended game
such that gµ(e)(σ(θ)) = f (θ) and c1(e1)+c2(e2)=c.
We will sometimes make the following assumption.
Assumption There exists a “unanimously worst outcome” d0 : for any state
θ, and any agent i, ui(d,θ) is minimized at d = d0. We normalize
utilities in such a way that ui(d0,θ)=0for all θ, all i.
3 Example : Facilitating Coordination
There are two agents, indexed by i =1 ,2 and two states, θ and φ. The set of
possible decisions is {a,b,c}. Interference probabilities are exogenous (i.e., µ
is given).Payoﬀs are as follows ( ε ∈ [0,1)).
abc
θ 2,23 ,ε 0,0
φε , 32 ,20 ,0
Hence, agent 1 always prefer b to a to c while agent 2 always prefer a to
b to c. Note that the surplus maximizing decision rule f (θ)=a, f (φ)=b is
not Nash implementable (failure of monotonicity) and is not subgame perfect
implementable (failure of a “test pair”)
8As we will show shortly, it is nevertheless easy to (weakly) implement f
in Nash: the direct game g (θ,θ)=a, g (φ,φ)=b,g (θ,φ)=g (φ,θ)=c has
indeed a truthful equilibrium.However, the direct game has also other equi-
libria.In par ticular, it is possible that a is always the equilibrium outcome.
With the possibility of interference, the truthful equilibrium is fragile.
Note that since agent 2 gains 1 if a is chosen instead of b in state φ, as long
as the cost of interference is less than 1, agent 1 will like to interfere and
have a as the equilibrium outcome.Similarly for agent 2 who would like to
interfere and generate outcome b in state θ.
But if both agents can interfere, then it is possible to fully implement
f by the direct revelation game.Moreover, in case ε =0 , any symmetric
interference technology µ1 = µ2 = µ ∈ (0,1) will make the direct game fully
implement f. The result, while somewhat surprising, is actually intuitive.In
state θ, agent 1 has a gain of 1 if he successfully interferes and obtains b
rather than a; however, since a is the surplus maximizing decision, the other
agent, agent 2, loses more than 1 when decision b is chosen instead of a :
therefore, agent 2 has even more incentive than 1 to interfere if she believes
that agent 1 will not be truthful.
Consider a symmetric interference technology and the direct game (Θ,g),
where g has been deﬁned above and ε =0 .We claim that in state θ the
unique equilibrium outcome is a. By symmetry, this shows that in state φ
the unique equilibrium outcome is b.
Observation Consider ε =0and the direct game (Θ,g). Truth-telling is
the unique equilibrium of the game for any µ =(µ,µ) with µ∈(0,1).
Proof. Consider state θ. Assume that agent 1 sends θ
1
1 on his channel and
θ
1









game”.Suppose that agent 2 sends θ
2
2 on his channel and θ
2









in the extended game.Then since an agent succeeds on his
channel with probability µ and succeeds on the other agent’s channel with






































with probability (1 − µ)µ.
Note that if a agent sends (θ,θ), the best response of the other agent is to
send (θ,θ). For instance, if 1 sends (θ,θ), agent 2 gets the maximum payoﬀ
of 2 in sending (θ,θ):any other strategy will generate a lower probability of
9getting decision a. If agent 2 sends (θ,θ), since the outcome is c in cases of
conﬂicts, if agent 1 sends (φ,φ), he obtains a payoﬀ of 5µ(1 − µ) which is
less than 2 since µ ∈ (0,1). If agent 1 sends (θ,φ) or (φ,θ) h i sp a y o ﬀi sl e s s
than 2 since he will either agree with agent 2 on state θ or will disagree with
positive probability.Hence truth- telling is indeed an equilibrium play.





















































and the unique best response of agent 2 is (θ,θ) since µ ∈ (0,1). But then
by the previous remark, (θ,φ) is not a best response to (θ,θ). The same








of agent 1.Hence, the unique
pure equilibrium strategy in state θ is truth-telling.Note that truth-telling
is in fact a strict Nash equilibrium.It then follows that truth-telling is also
the unique equilibrium in mixed strategies.
Remark 2 We have so far assumed that agents cannot exert eﬀort and
change the security of their channels. Consider the case ε =0 . Letting µ0 > 0
be the initial (symmetric) security of the channels, say due to existing public
investments, etc., assume that each agent can increase the security on his
channel to µ>µ 0 at cost c(µ − µ0). Assume that agent 2 does not invest in
security, hence that µ2 = µ0. If agent 1 has security µ1 ≥ µ0 on his channel,
then, given that agent 2 is truthful, agent 1 obtains by deviating in state θ a
payoﬀ
u
1((φ,φ),(θ,θ)) = 3µ1(1 −µ0)+2 µ0(1 − µ1)
agent 1 ﬁnds it beneﬁcial to deviate only if u1((φ,φ),(θ,θ)) ≥ u1((θ,θ),(θ,θ)) =
2, i.e., if
µ1(3 − 5µ0) ≥ 2(1− µ0).
If µ0 ≥
3
5, agent 1 cannot gain from deviating, even if his channel is more
secure (µ1 >µ 0) and since he does not want to interfere, agent 1 has no









3−5µ0 > 1 which is impossible.
10If µ0 < 1
3 then agent 1 gains in state θ when µ1 ≥
2(1−µ0)
3−5µ0 . Assuming that
each state has equal probability, agent 1’s utility gain is equal to 1
2δ(µ1) −
c(µ1 − µ0), where δ(µ1)=µ1(3 − 5µ0) − 2(1− µ0) is the utility gain in
state θ. Note that δ(µ1) is increasing and is equal to zero at µ1 =
2(1−µ0)
3−5µ0 ,
which is strictly greater than
2
3 since µ0 ≥ 0. Hence, in order to replicate the
outcome without deviation, agent 1 needs to exert an eﬀort that will increase
the security on his channel by at least 1
3, and the smaller µ0 is, the larger the
eﬀort that agent 1 has to exert to replicate the outcome without deviation,





is large enough, even if µ0 is close
to 0, agent 1 will not want to deviate. For instance, let c(µ1 − µ0)=µ1−µ0








5, the marginal gain is positive and agent 1 maximizes his payoﬀ








the maximum from deviation is attained at µ1 = µ0. Hence, independently
of the initial public investment µ0 ∈ (0,1), the unique equilibrium of the
extended game is for agents not to modify the security of their channel, to be
truthful and the surplus maximizing decision rule is fully implemented by the
direct game.
Obviously, if the marginal cost c￿ (µ1 − µ0) is “small” around 0, agent 1
will in general gain from deviating if µ0 is small. For instance, if c(µ1 − µ0)=
(µ1−µ0)2






15. If µ0 is smaller than this bound, then both agents will invest in
additional security.
Remark 3 The assumption that the set of decisions is {a,b,c} is not in-
nocuous. If one extends D to include lotteries over these outcomes,6 then
the decision rule f (θ)=a and f (φ)=b is monotonic. For instance, letting
π denote the lottery (π22,π11,1 −π11 − π22), agent 1 prefers a to π in state
θ but prefers π to a in state φ and monotonicity is not violated for f. As it
is well known, monotonicity is far from being suﬃcient when there are only
two agents ([16]). Nevertheless, for the example at hand, if lotteries can be
used, full implementation is obtained by the following game (when channels
are secure). Let h :Θ 2 →{ a,b,c} be such that h(θ1,θ 2)=c if θ1 ￿= θ2 and
h(θ,θ)=f (θ). The messages are M1 = M2 =Θ 2, and the outcome func-

























πij. If lotteries cannot be used as outcomes, then our model suggests that the
6For another use of lotteries in implementation, see Abreu-Matsushima [1].
11design of communication structures that are not perfectly secure can create
the desired randomization.
The result of Observation 3 generalizes to any ε ∈ [0,2/3) :one can always
ﬁnd a symmetric interference structure (µ,µ) such that the eﬃcient decision
is the unique equilibrium outcome of the extended game corresponding to the
direct game (Θ,h) where h(θ,φ)=h(φ,θ)=d0 andh(θ,θ)=a, h(φ,φ)=b.
The proof of the following proposition mimics the proof of Observation 3: the









i, agent −i’s unique best response is (θ,θ). Note that as ε is close to 0,µ
can be chosen as small as we want but that as ε approaches 2/3,µmust be
chosen close to 1
2.For ε ≥ 2/3, it is not possible to rule out b in state θ as
an outcome of this mechanism.




















Then the unique equilibrium of the extended game corresponding to the direct
game is the eﬃcient decision rule.
There are two main lessons to draw from this example.First, interference
structures can facilitate the implementation of desired decision rules since by
creating “voice” on other agents’ channels, interference creates the possibility
for agents to signal their disagreement.This intuition is very similar to the
type of construction used in the implementation literature.In fact, as we
noted in our Remark 3, the logic is in fact equivalent since there exists, in
a perfectly secured environment, a mechanism in which each agent sends
an ordered pair of states and the decision rule depends on the results of
a lottery that selects a pair among all possible pairs.We show in the next
section that while we do not insist on full implementation here, the revelation
principle by which we can describe the set of allocations is based on the same
logic.Second, the example suggests that there is a relationship between the
stakes (measured by 2−ε) and the minimal security of channels required for
implementation.The agent who gains by imposing the ineﬃcient decision
gains 1 but the other agent loses 2 − ε. As ε increases, the other agent loses
less from a deviation and therefore has less incentives to signal the deviation
or to secure his channel.This explains why as ε increases it is more diﬃcult
to obtain full implementation with a given security structure.In general,
the logic that agents have less incentives to interfere when the stakes are
lower seems rather intuitive.We will show in an appli cation how this logic
is articulated and how our approach can provide some foundations for the
emergence of authority relationships in some contracting environments and
the emergence of “consensual” relationships in others.
124 The Noninterference Principle
The previous example proved that a direct game satisfying truth-telling can
implement the surplus maximizing decision rule.Readers familiar with the
revelation principle would not be surprised by this observation. However, it
turns out that some care must be taken before generalizing this observation.
Indeed, a necessary condition for (Θ,h) to represent the outcome of an
equilibrium σ of (M,g) is that h(θ,θ)=gµ (σ1(θ),σ 2(θ)) where µ = µ(e),
e is the equilibrium choice of eﬀort levels.Suppose that there is a worst
outcome and that h(θ,φ)=h(φ,θ)=d0. If agent 1 uses strategy (φ,φ) in the
direct game and if agent 2 uses the strategy (θ,θ), the outcome is h(φ,φ)=
gµ (σ1(φ),σ 2(φ)) with probability π11 and h(θ,θ)=gµ (σ1(θ),σ2(θ)) with




































and there is no immediate relationship between the two conditions.In the
direct game, when agent 1 interferes, he can in fact change (with some prob-
ability) the strategy that agent 2 uses in the initial mechanism.To avoid this
problem, one needs to be able to distinguish whether a message received on
channel 2 was sent by agent 1 or by agent 2.Obviously, the structure does
not allow us to have this information and therefore agents must “self-signal”
their identity.To induce agents to signal their identity, it is then necessary
to adjust the outcome with respect to the believed origin of the message.
Hence, if one receives on channel 1 a message labeled “1” and on channel 2 a
message labeled “1”, the outcome will be a function h11 while if one receives
on channel 1 a message labeled “2” and on chan n e l2am e s s a g el a b e l e d“ 1 ” ,
the outcome will be a function h21.In the example above, all the hij func-
tions were taken to be the same, but this is not a general property.In fact,
since it is also necessary to induce the agents to invest in the “right” level
of security, it is necessary in general to have diﬀerent functions hij (the next
example will be such an example).
A way to think of our revelation principle is that we ﬁrst create for each
initial channel i, two “virtual” channels, one for each agent .Incentive com-
patibility requires that each agent “tells the truth”: announces the true state
and his true identity on his virtual channel.On each initial channel i, the
probability that the message sent on the virtual channel j succeeds is equal to
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Figure 2:
Hence, we have here a “two-dimensional” incentive compatibility problem
and it is this additional dimension that enables us to replicate in the direct
game the independence of strategies that exists in the initial game.
Adirect game is deﬁned by message sets M1 =Θ ×{1,2},M 2 =Θ ×{1,2}
and an outcome function h((θ,i),(φ,j)) = hij (θ,φ). Fixing µ, we deﬁne
a truth-telling equilibrium in the extended game by the strategy γi(θ)=
((θ,i),(θ,i)).7
Proposition 5 Consider an equilibrium (e,σ) of the extended game corre-
sponding to the mechanism (M,g) and consider the decision rule f (θ)=
gµ(e) ◦σ(θ). There exists a direct game (Θ ×{ 1,2},h) such that, if γ is the
truth-telling strategy, (e,γ) is an equilibrium of the corresponding extended
game and such that f (θ)=hµ(e) ◦ γ (θ).
Proof. Appendix.
When there is a worst outcome, incentive compatibility of agent 1 takes
two forms, depending on the nature of his deviation.Agent 1 can either tell
the truth about the state but lie about his identity or he can lie about the
state but tell the truth about his identity.Additional conditions are that e
is indeed an equilibrium, i.e., that (2) holds for the direct game.
7Note that we require truth-telling only when agent i has taken his equilibrium eﬀort. If
agent i deviates from his equilibrium eﬀort, his play in the extended game will be diﬀerent
from truth-telling.
145Authority as a Solution to the Interference
Problem
Consider a ﬁrm with n agents.The agents have to decide on which production
technology to use, and we index the technology by a parameter q ∈ R+ that
we will also call “decision”.Once the technology is settled upon, an output
is realized that is equal to Y (q)=Y −
1
2 (q − q∗)
2; 8 Agents might disagree
on which technology is best, and this disagreement might be a function of
the state of the world.For instance, engineers and mark eting people might
disagree on the degree of quality that the production line should produce:
the larger the quality, the slower the pace of the production.Engineers
value quality but marketing people value volume.Among engineers, some
might prefer to produce sport cars while others might prefer to produce





⊂ R+ indexes the state of the world and each αi is diﬀerentiable.







A contract speciﬁes an income Ii(θ) and a decision q(θ) for each an-




The ﬁrst best is attained when each agent does not invest in securing his
channel and “tells the truth”.We will prove that as long as the preferences of
the agents are consonant, even if an agent can perfectly interfere with other
agents’ channels, he will still prefer not to interfere and to tell the truth.
Trivially, if for each θ the sum
￿
αi(θ) is constant (for instance, α is an
element of the n−1 simplex), there is a uniform optimal decision and agents
can contract ex-ante on this decision.(There is no need for message games
to reveal the state unless one is also worried about ex-post utility levels.)
When the sum of the beneﬁts varies across states, implementation is less
obvious.Starting from µ =( 0,0), if agent 1 deviates and secure his channel
perfectly, he can decide on the outcome since π11 =1 . A suﬃcient condition
for such a deviation not to be beneﬁcial is when agent 1 will in fact choose
the outcome that would have been chosen under µ =(0,0). This suﬃcient
condition amounts to show that the initial contract would make agent 1 be
8By risk neutrality and the absence of moral hazard in production, this might as well be
the mean of a stochastic variable. We will consider this interpretation when we introduce
monotone mechanisms.
15truthful even if he could choose the outcome.The same reasoning applies to
agent 2.Conditions for an agent to be “classically” incentive compatible are





















































Moreover, dividing both sides by
￿
θ − ˆ θ
￿2






j￿ (θ) ≥ 0. (6)
If (5) does not hold, then an agent who can interfere perfectly with other
agents’ messages has an incentive to deviate from truth-telling.If the cost
of interfering perfectly goes to zero, (6) is in fact a necessary condition for
implementation of the ﬁrst best.It is not suﬃcient in general (this has to
do with global versus local incentive compatibility).We provide a suﬃcient
condition below.
Deﬁnition 6 Let αi be the derivative of αi and α￿ =( α1￿,...,α n￿). The
agents have consonant preferences if α￿ ≥ 0 or if α￿ ≤ 0.
Linear case αi (θ)=αiθ. In this case, consonance occurs when all αi are
of the same sign.
Proposition 7 Suppose that agents are consonant. Then the ﬁrst best can
be implemented.



















































and since αj is diﬀerentiable, by dividing all






























































and budget balancing is satisﬁed everywhere.
We prove our claim if we show that the local incentive compatibility
condition implies the global incentive compatibility condition.Here, the













be the utility of i if he interferes in state θ and succeeds in





−ui(θ,θ) > 0. Standard arguments show that failure of global















j￿ (y) ≥ 0
and we obtain a contradiction (for instance, if ˆ θ>θ ,then x>θand the
integrand is negative).
Example 8 In the linear case, if
￿
αj ￿=0and agents are consonant, the
ﬁrst best decision rule q∗(θ) can be implemented with a mechanism with a
linear sharing rule Ii(θ)=siY (q∗(θ)), where si = αi
￿
αj.









17We now come to the case in which the ﬁrst best decision is state contingent
and in which agents are not consonant.
Here we appeal to our noninterference principle.We assume that µi(e)
depends only on i￿s eﬀort level on his own channel, in particular, it is not
possible for agent 1 to change the security level on channel 2.This enables
us to identify the eﬀort level of i by µi and to deﬁne the cost of eﬀort by
c(µi) (we assume symmetric cost functions).We restrict attention to the
linear case: αi(θ)=αiθ for all i and all θ.
5.1 Two Agents
Assume that α1(θ)=αθ,t h a tα2(θ)=βθ and that α + β>0 while
α>0 >β .To simplify notation, let q∗ =0 . The ﬁrst best is
q
∗(θ)=( α + β)θ.
Note that agent 1 would like q to increase (since α<0) and agent 2
would like q to decrease (since β>0) with respect to the ﬁrst best situation.
However, agent 1 has the same direction of preferences as the ﬁrst best while
agent 2 has an opposite direction of preferences.We are interested in ﬁnding
contracts that maximize the ex-ante total surplus of the relationship.The
underlying assumption is that agents can make ex-ante transfers in order
to select such a contract.As we can anticipate from our previous work
([11], [12]), the conclusions (in terms of information structure) will be quite
diﬀerent if agents have limited means of transferring money ex-ante, say
because they have limited wealth and/or because the ﬁnancial market is
imperfect.
Suppose that there can be two levels of eﬀort: high eﬀort makes the
channel perfectly secure (µi =1 ) and low eﬀort makes the channel insecure
(µi =0 ).The cost of high eﬀort is c>0 and the cost of low eﬀort is zero.
We consider only pure strategy equilibria in eﬀort levels.
There are four possible communication structures since µ ∈{0,1}
2. In the
case µ =(1,0), agent 1 can select the outcome and agent 2 cannot interfere.
We view this situation as a situation of “authority”.The case µ =(0,1) is
the mirror case but we will show that this case is ex-ante dominated by the
previous case: if an agent has authority, it should be the agent who has
the same direction of preferences as in the ﬁrst best.This result generalizes
n i c e l yt ot h en person case.
Whether or not authority emerges as the optimal communication struc-
ture depends on the implied cost that the incentive compatibility constraints
impose on the ex-ante contract and on the stakes that are present in the
18ﬁrst best contract.Remember that two sets of conditions must be satisﬁed:
ﬁrst, truth-telling must hold given the equilibrium structure µ, second, no
agent must want to change his eﬀort level.For instance, agent 2 does not
want to increase µ2 and agent 1 does not want to decrease µ1 when respect
to µ =(1,0).
5.1.1 A Necessary Condition for Authority
When µ =(1,0), agent 1 can eﬀectively select the messages that will be
received since π =(1,0,0,0).Incentive compatibility of agent 2 is immediate





















. Incentive compatibility means
that agent 1 prefers to send the message ((θ,1),(θ,1)) in state θ. This implies
two conditions:
• Agent 1 does not want to misrepresent the state.
• Agent 1 does not want to lie about his identity.
The second condition is easily satisﬁed by assuming that hij = d0 as
long as ij ￿=1 . The ﬁrst condition is easier to satisfy if h11 (θ,φ)=d0
whenever θ ￿= φ.Since by sending ((φ,1),(φ,1)) agent 1 selects the decision
h11 (φ,φ), the ﬁrst condition is satisﬁed when for each state θ, agent 1 prefers
h11 (θ,θ) to h11 (φ,φ) for any φ. Since the worst decision is chosen if the two
announced states disagree, we might simply write h11 (θ) to denote h11 (θ,θ)
and we have just stated that h11 (considered as a function of one variable)
must be incentive compatible in the “classical” sense.From our previous
observations, this implies that in h11 =( I11,q 11),q 11 is increasing in θ and
I11 is diﬀerentiable and satisﬁes I￿
11 (θ)=−αθq￿
11 (θ).
Now, we have to verify that agents indeed want to exert the right eﬀorts
in terms of securing their channels.If agent 1 does not exert eﬀort, then
π =(0,0,1,0), i.e., each agent succeeds on the other channels.Since 2 is





















. However, since h2j = d0,
agent 1 does not gain by exerting a low level of eﬀort as long as his expected
equilibrium utility is positive (i.e., there is enough surplus in the relationship
to compensate 1 for his cost of eﬀort c), which is what we will assume from
now on.
Suppose now that agent 2 deviates and exerts the high level of eﬀort,
i.e., generates a security structure (1,1) and π =(0,1,0,0). Since agent 1


























= d0 whenever j ￿=1or θ
2
2 ￿= θ, agent 2 can either replicate the
decision h11 (θ,θ) or obtain the worst outcome d0. Hence, agent 2 cannot be
made strictly better oﬀ.As long as c>0, agent 2 will not exert the high
level of eﬀort.
Clearly, incentives to exert the high eﬀort level are strongest for agent 1,
the larger is his payoﬀ under µ =(1,0). It follows that we might as well take
h11 to be the eﬃcient decision rule, subject to the incentive compatibility
condition (7).
Lemma 9 Let W ∗ be the ﬁrst best level of total ex-ante surplus and assume
that W ∗ >c . A lower bound on the total welfare is that obtained with 1-
authority and is equal to W ∗ − c.








agent 1 is incentive compatible given µ =(1,0) and the outcome function h11.
The arguments in the text conclude the proof.
What about 2￿s having authority? Replicating the reasoning in the text,
if the equilibrium is µ =(0,1)–agent 2 has authority– h22 must be incentive
compatibility.However, incentive compatibility for 2 implies that q22 is non-
increasing in θ; this is a simple illustration of 2 having a diﬀerent direction
of preferences than the ﬁrst best.It is straightforward then that the s urplus
maximizing contract–conditional on µ =( 0 ,1) and truth-telling being an
equilibrium– is for q22 (θ,θ) to be a constant.Maximizing welfare subject to





, i.e., the constant
decision should be equal to the ﬁrst best decision at the average state. It
follows that authority to 2 yields a lower total surplus than the combination
of insecure channels and a constant decision (since c is saved in the later
case).Letting E denote the expectation with respect to F, and var the






















The following is then immediate.
Proposition 10 1-authority dominates a constant decision rule if and only
if the cost of securing a channel is such that c ≤
(α+β)2
2 var[θ].
From Proposition 7, if β =0 , then 1 and 2 are consonant and the ﬁrst best
can be attained with µ =(0,0). Hence, as long as β is not “too negative”, the
20best contract compatible with µ =(0,0) dominates the best contract with
µ =(1,0). When β = −α, the optimal decision is the decision q =0 . Hence,
as long as β is “not too diﬀerent” from −α, the structure µ =(0,0) will again
be optimal.
Hence, if 1-authority is optimal, it will be optimal for intermediate values
of β. We show indeed below that 1-authority is optimal when β takes inter-
mediate values.But we also show that 1-authority is more likely to emerge
as the variance in the ﬁrst best decisions is important.This shows how the
stakes created in the eﬃcient decision rule (stakes that are proportional to
the variance of the state) inﬂuence the incentives of agents to interfere and
how these stakes make the cost c spent by agent 1 for securing his channel
the exact bound on contract eﬃciency.This bound is attained only when
agent 1 has authority.
5.1.2 A Suﬃcient Condition for authority
Assume that µ =(0,0) is part of an equilibrium, i.e., that both agents exert
the low eﬀort.In this case, each agent has access to a secure channel: the
channel of the other agent.The easiest way to satisfy incentive compatibility
is to set hij (θ,φ)=d0 when ij ￿=2 1or when θ ￿= φ. This is enough to make
any decision rule incentive compatible once µ =( 0 ,0) is given.
Now, each agent can unilaterally change the security structure and once
he has done so he can select in each state θ the outcome in the range of h21
that he prefers.Remember that if agent 1 secures his channel, then with
probability one his message will succeed on both channels (π =(1,0,0,0))
and by using the strategy ((φ,2),(φ,1)) he can eﬀectively “select” the out-
come h21 (φ,φ). Because only the deviations in which the same message is
sent on each channel can be beneﬁcial, we simplify notation and write h(φ)
instead of h21 (φ,φ); no ambiguity should arise.We also write the shares
and the decision rule that are chosen under h21 (θ,θ) as Ii (θ) and q(θ). It is
convenient to write the decision rule in terms of a shift with respect to the
ﬁrst best decision
q(θ)=( α + β)d(θ) (8)
Note that the ﬁrst best decision rule corresponds to d(θ)=θ for each θ.
Denote the expected utility of agent i when the decision corresponding





If i unilaterally exerts the high eﬀort, then in state θ he will send mes-
sages in order to maximize ui(φ,θ). Let φ
i(θ) be a solution to the problem















The surplus maximizing mechanism conditional on agents exerting the
low eﬀort will solve the problem
￿
maxh W (h)=E [W (θ)]
s.t. (9), i =1 ,2.
(10)
where W (θ) is the total surplus in state θ given the mechanism h. By budget
balancing, W (θ)=Y (q(θ) )+( α + β)θq(θ).




















decreasing in θ (see the proof in the appendix for details).We will not
attempt here to fully characterize the solution to (10), but rather we will
derive conditions under which the optimal welfare in (10) is less than W ∗−c,
which proves that 1-authority is indeed optimal.
Consider again the moral hazard constraint for agent 2.Clearly, for each





















































+ β(α + β)E [θ]E [d(θ)].











+ β (α + β)E [θd(θ)]






≤ E [u2(θ,θ)] + c, it follows that a necessary
condition for (9) is (using the fact that β<0)
E [θd(θ)] ≤ E [θ]E [d(θ)] −
c
β (α + β)
. (11)






+( α + β)
2E [θd(θ)] and






−c. Therefore, if 1-authority








































Note that the right hand side is positive since β<0 a n di sg r e a t e rt h a n
c
(α+β)
2 since −β<α .The left hand side is minimized when the variance of
d(θ) is equal to zero and when the expectation of θ and of d[θ] are equal.This
happens for the (best) constant decision that we described in the previous
section.Whenever the mechanism in (10) is not the constant decision, the
left hand side is greater than
var[θ]


















The condition in Proposition 11 is intuitive.The ﬁrst best decision is
increasing with the state and the variance of the ﬁrst best decision is pro-
portional to the variance of the state (is equal to (α + β)
2var[θ]).For any
mechanism, if agent 2 was able to select the decision (in the range of the
decisions available in the mechanism), he would do so in such a way that
the decision is a decreasing function of the state.The larger the variance in
the decision rule of the mechanism, the greater is the beneﬁt for agent 2 to
select his preferred decisions.The variance of the ﬁrst best decision depends
both on the variance in the state and on the diﬀerence in the preference
parameters of the two agents.As long as c, the cost of interfering is not too
large, a large initial variance of the state and a large initial ﬁrst best weight
will create incentives for agent 2 to interfere.
11The bound on the right hand side achieves its minimum value of 27c
4α2 for β = −1
3α.
The condition can therefore be satisﬁed for some values of β when var[θ] > 27c
2α2.
235.2 n Agents
The basic logic of the case n =2extends to the case n ≥ 3. Consider
the situation in which the {αi} are decreasing in i,
￿
αi > 0 and there
exists k such that αk > 0 >α k+1. In this case, agents {1,...,k} have
consonant preferences with the ﬁrst best and agents {k +1 ,...,n} have
dissonant preferences with the ﬁrst best.Our principle extends readily to







in the n−1 simplex where µ
j
i denotes the probability
with which agent j succeeds on channel i).
To simplify, continue to assume that agents can either secure their channel
or not.If channel i is secured, i.e., ei =1 , then µi
i =1(only player i can





(each player has an equal chance of succeeding on channel i). Suppose that




n−1 for j ￿= i. As before, as long as the security
structure does not change, any mechanism is incentive compatible in our
sense.Suppose that agent j exerts high eﬀort e1 =1(at cost c>0)a n d
deviates from truth-telling.Since other agents are telling the truth, as long
as h = d0 when announcements about the state disagree, agent j will be able





probability 1 − p will select decision d0. Clearly for n large, the probability
of selecting d0 is close to one and no agent can gain by exerting high eﬀort.12
For small values of n, an agent might still beneﬁt from exerting high
eﬀort and deviating from truth telling.Replicating the reasoning that we
made for the case n =2 , we can show that as long as var[θ] is large enough,
the best mechanism with e = 0 is dominated by authority. In the n =2
case, authority should be given to the agent who has the same direction of
preferences as the ﬁrst best, i.e., to agent 1 since α1 > 0. However, since
agent 1 must be incentive compatible in the classical sense, it is necessary
that the sharing rule for agent 2 is a non trivial function of the state.In the
case n ≥ 3, if there exists j such that αj =
￿
αi, then we can give authority
to j, pay all other agents a ﬁxed wage and make agent j the full residual
claimant for the revenue.This is suggestive of the fact that authority should
be given to agents whose preferences coincide with the social preferences.
This also suggests that we should observe authority ﬁgures who are somehow
“consensual” rather than extremists.
12We might question however the relevance of the assumption that a large number of
agents have common information while outsiders do not.
246 Discussion
Our examples illustrate that the consideration of interference can lead to new
insights about contracting and organization.The noninterference principle
makes the program tractable.Already it leads to a new interpretation and
account of authority in organizations: in environments where communication
cannot be secured at no cost, and when the stakes are suﬃciently high, it
may be optimal to give to one person authority in its dual sense: the power
to decide and the power of inﬂuence.
There are a number of obvious extensions to the model that we have not
yet considered, including continuous eﬀort choices.More interesting perhaps
is a comparison of voting with authority: even if a median voter would make
the same decision as the representative player with authority, the diﬀerences
in the costs of securing channels may make authority desirable.On the other
hand if the distribution is skewed so that the representative and the median
are very diﬀerent, authority will not perform well and majority rule may
dominate.
We outline some issues on the agenda.
One observation is that a person who is already inﬂuential may end up
getting decision power because it is very cheap to secure his channel.For
instance, reputation could be an important source of channel security; thus
a bankrupt Donald Trump can get control over new real estate development
projects.Similarly, if we relax the assumption that there is no binding limit
to ex-ante transfers, considering the surplus maximizing outcome is no longer
justiﬁed.With wealth eﬀects, for instance, we might expect the wealthiest
to get authority, even if this isn’t optimal, simply because they are able to
aﬀord secure channels (Legros-Newman [11], [12]).Someone with a great
reputation may get authority (decision power) for the same reason.
Authority as we have modeled it can help to explain why corporations are
frequently personiﬁed by one individual.It can also help us understand why
the one agent paradigm might be reasonable, especially when the standard
mechanism desing approach would predict a strong discontinuity between
the one and the two agent models.For instance, as should be well known, if
two agents have correlated information in a ﬁrm, they will not be subject to
borrowing constraint while a one agent ﬁrm would be.Once one allows for
interference, contracts that would relax the borrowing constraint in the two
agent case may no longer be feasible.
257 Appendix
7.1 Proof of Proposition
Step 1: Consider an equilibrium (e,σ) of the extended game corresponding
to (M,g). Consider sets ˆ Mi that are disjoint and that contain two diﬀerent
“copies” of Θ. For instance, let ˆ M1 = ˆ M2 =Θ×{1,2}. Below we ﬁx e at his
equilibrium value and let σi (θ) stands for σi (θ,µi),.π ij stands for πij (e),
etc.We want to show that there exists a fun ction h : ˆ M1 × ˆ M2 → D such





agents ﬁnd it optimal to “tell the truth” on each channel: hence agent i ﬁnds
it optimal to send ((θ,i),(θ,i)) in state θ when the other agent is telling the
truth.Moreover, we want to argue that with such mechanism, each agent also
ﬁnds it optimal to play his equilibrium ei when the other agent is expected
to do the same.










if θ = φ
d0 otherwise.
We claim that the strategy γ where γi(θ)=( ( θ,i),(θ,i)) is an equilibrium of



















and therefore that hµ ◦ γ = gµ ◦ σ. To show the equilib-











. Since agent 2 uses the strategy γ2(θ)=( ( θ,2),(θ,2)), the
































h((θ,2),(θ,2)) with probability π22
Note that the outcome h((θ,2),(θ,2)) arises with probability π22 inde-
pendently of the strategy of agent 1.Hence, only the ﬁrst three outcomes
depend on the strategy of agent 1.If θ1 ￿= θ2 ￿= θ the agent obtains a lottery
in which he gets d0 with probability 1 − π22 and h((θ,2),(θ,2)) with prob-
ability π22; hence agent 1 cannot be strictly better oﬀ than when he plays






































If agent 1 prefers strictly this lottery to the lottery when there is truth-








state θ in the initial game.But this contradicts the equilibrium property of
σ in the initial extended game.
Suppose now that agent 1 want to choose ˆ e1 ￿= e1 at the ﬁrst stage.
Let ˆ µ = µ(ˆ e1,e2) be the new vector describing the security of the channels.
When the agents play, agent 2 does not obtain information about the eﬀort
level of 1 and continues to use his truthful strategy.Suppose that agent 1
uses a strategy ˆ γ






























We note that since hij (φ,θ)=d0, for any θ,
max
































for some ij and some θ1,θ 2, then agent 1 by
using ˆ m1 =( ( θ1,i),(θ2,j)) will either obtain the same payoﬀ or will ob-








−c1(ˆ e1) > Eu1(gµ (σ1(θ),σ 2(θ)),θ)−c1(e1),
which contradicts the assumption that (e,σ) is an equilibrium of the ex-
tended game (M,g).










and going through the same steps as before.Finally, deﬁning hij (θ,φ)=
h((θ,i),(φ,j)) establishes the proposition.
7.2 Proof of Monotonicity









are increasing in θ when i =1


















































































































































As q ≥ 0, the result follows.
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